This paper argues for the existence of a kind of action, involving multiple agents, that is not captured by our accounts of joint action. In these cases, one agent acts in support of another, rather than the two agents acting together to realise a shared intention. It argues that the extant accounts of joint action involve a symmetry between the agents, each acting with the same intention, which is a feature not just of the accounts but of the phenomenon they describe. Following this, examples of ‘dependent intentional action’ are offered, to illustrate that this kind of action is commonplace. These are cases of ‘direct helping,’ but not in the course of a joint or collective action. Moreover, dependent actions lack the necessary symmetry to themselves be instances of joint action. Rather than each agent acting with the same intention, one acts with an intention to φ, and the other to help the first to φ. The supported agent, acting with an intention to φ, also has a guiding role over the action as a whole that adds to this asymmetry. These actions complicate the picture we have of the ways we can act alongside one another.