This paper aims to contribute to the deontic buck-passing project, that is, the project of analysing deontic properties and concepts in terms of normative reasons. I focus on the question of whether the project of analysing the deontic notion of a claim-right in terms of reasons is neutral with respect to other questions about rights. I argue, specifically, that buck-passers about rights must accept that rights are contributory rather than absolute notions, that their content is fully general rather than specified with exceptive clauses, and that they cannot be fully neutral among different theories of rights. First, I argue that since moral reasons could not be in principle indefeasible, insofar as rights are grounded in reasons, they cannot be indefeasible or absolute. Second, I argue that since specificationism about rights entails absolutism and buck-passers must reject absolutism, they must also reject specificationism. Finally, I argue that since rights correlate to directed duties, the notion of directedness must also be located at the level of reasons. However, one cannot make sense of this notion at the level of reasons if one appeals to theories such as the will theory. Hence, insofar as buck-passers must reject the will theory.