Until recently, metaphysical foundationalism, i.e., the idea that there are fundamental (ungrounded) facts that serve as the metaphysical (explanatory) basis of all derivative facts, was the dominant view about the structure of reality. Recently, however, more and more philosophers have raised objections against metaphysical foundationalism and developed rival views, such as metaphysical infinitism and coherentism. It has been argued that those rival views can accommodate the explanatory desiderata of a theory of the structure of the world at least as well as metaphysical foundationalism, if not better. The paper investigates the dialectic of the debate between metaphysical foundationalism vs. anti-foundationalism, by paying special attention to infinitism. It targets a key assumption in the discussion by arguing that the real issue isn’t which theory best meets a fixed set of explanatory desiderata, but rather what those very desiderata should be in the first place.