This talk examines the divide between events and processes, questioning whether a deep ontological distinction is necessary. Dualists argue that events are static, closed, and perduring, while processes are dynamic, ongoing, and enduring, drawing on aspectual expressions like perfectivity and telicity. I challenge this framework and propose a unified, monistic account that explains the differences without positing distinct ontological categories.

Central to my proposal is a slot-structured mereological framework, where occurrences are four-dimensional individuals composed of instantaneous states or temporal stages. I introduce a distinction in how occurrences realize their essential kind, which models the above mentioned expressions. This structural approach preserves the explanatory power of dualism without requiring fundamentally different ontological categories.

Through this distinction, I show that occurrences can accommodate change and persistence within a perdurantist framework, challenging the dualist claim that only enduring entities can change. I also address the problem of interruption, arguing that interrupted events are better understood as unfulfilled attempts at realization, while occurrences that realize their kind continuously are never incomplete—they simply end. My approach offers a parsimonious framework to unify telicity, persistence, and change.