The idea that logic is not special regarding its subject matter, epistemic justification or methods of theory choice has gained currency in recent years, usually cashed out in terms of continuity with the empirical sciences. While the label "anti-exceptionalism about logic" (AEL hereafter) is new, I intend to show how the relevant issues for this trend are part of a long story dating back most crucially to the late 19th century. Since Quine's naturalism is taken as the main inspiration for the movement, I propose a comparative and historical study focused mainly on the influences of C. I. Lewis’ conceptual pragmatism, Dewey’s anti-foundationalism, Carnap's empiricism and, as the last stop, Frege's anti-psychologism in the context of the project of a scientific philosophy. By drawing attention to the development of anti-exceptional ideas about logic, the significance of AEL as a viable alternative epistemology of logic can be properly assessed.