In this paper, I analyze the relationship between us and our digital avatars. Adopting a four-dimensionalist metaphysics, I argue that persons are “hybrid” fusions whose temporal parts are partly located in virtual and non-virtual worlds. Virtual parts are defined as temporal parts existing in virtual worlds, making the relationship between our biological persons and our digital avatars akin to the one between our present self and our past self. I contend that if we characterize persons as maximal aggregates of non-virtual and virtual parts, we can better understand why responsibility for actions in virtual worlds ultimately resides with the people we see and interact with in the biological world. Digital avatars, while not persons themselves, function as non-maximal temporal parts of a person, and then their actions do not merely reflect on persons but are their actions.

I take into consideration a possible objection based on a version of Johnston's (2016) "personite problem", namely the “avatar-personite problem”: biological persons and their avatars may have opposing interests, complicating responsibility attribution and accountability. I maintain that Priority Perdurantism (Skrzypek, 2024) offers a robust solution to the avatar-personite problem and responds to Sweeney's (2023) concerns about the "epistemic gap" and responsibility attribution.