Philosophers engaged in the debate on cultural appropriation have observed that such appropriation appears morally problematic when it affects oppressed cultural groups but not when it affects dominant ones. In this talk, I will focus on a specific kind of cultural appropriation called style appropriation. Style appropriation occurs when members of one cultural group adopt styles distinctive of another, such as certain clothes, hairstyles, adornments, or designs. The aim is to offer a novel argument for why style appropriation is morally problematic when it affects oppressed but not dominant cultural groups. The argument proceeds in three steps: (i) Style appropriation can cause the silencing of people who use culturally specific styles to communicate their cultural identity. (ii) This silencing is morally problematic when it affects members of oppressed cultural groups because it undermines vital interests linked to their group’s social status. (iii) In contrast, such silencing isn’t similarly problematic for members of dominant cultural groups because, due to their group’s status, they don’t have these same interests.