Internalist and pluralist accounts of what gender a person has, particularly those that rest their case on an ameliorative methodology, require a normatively acceptable concept of gender identity. But many existing accounts of gender identity, I suspect, risk legitimizing pernicious social views. I argue that this is the case because there is a broad consensus among emancipatory ameliorative theorists that holds that accounts of gender identity should secure First-Person Authority (FPA) over one’s gender. I break from this consensus and argue that our concept of gender identity should be such that it allows for individuals to be wrong – and perhaps even for it to be ethical to correct them – about their gender (identity) in some cases where they have harmful beliefs (e.g., when they are transphobic). I introduce and defend my ameliorative account of gender identity, which I call the Cognitive Disposition View (CDV). According to CDV, to have a certain gender identity is to be disposed to desire and experience as intrinsic a certain gender categorization (concerning a given class system of gender) when one holds a sufficiently small amount of pernicious social beliefs.