When we learn that someone holds irrational beliefs, we often respond by reducing our epistemic trust in them: regarding the topic in question, we are less inclined to believe them, less confident in their abilities to form true beliefs, and less willing to partner with them in inquiry. In my talk, I will propose a novel account of epistemic trust reductions. The recently popular relationship-modification account of epistemic blame (RMA) will serve as a foil for this project. RMA says that epistemically blaming others for their epistemic failings involves modifying our epistemic relationships with them, paradigmatically via a reduction of epistemic trust. RMA has faced two challenges, which I will show result from a mistaken view about epistemic trust reductions. On my account, epistemic trust reductions play an essential role in governing the division of epistemic labor. By drawing on resources from legal theory, I will more specifically argue that trust reductions bear all the hallmarks of so-called non-punitive measures, which exclusively serve preventative collective purposes. The resulting account of epistemic trust reductions as non-punitive epistemic measures (NoPEM) explains when and why it is appropriate to reduce epistemic trust and shows where RMA goes wrong.