While T. M. Scanlon’s moral contractualism is widely regarded as a plausible moral theory, it is threatened by the so-called ‘ideal world objection.’ What this objection draws attention to is that contractualism’s appeal to principles that are generally accepted causes the view to overlook whenever acting in the relevant way would be very bad under more realistic circumstances with lower acceptance levels. In response to this worry, it has been suggested in the more recent literature that contractualists should give up on the notion of principles and shift their evaluative focal point to actions or maxims instead. As I will argue in this talk, however, adopting this maneuver would bring serious problems of a different kind for contractualist theory. Instead of shifting their evaluative focal point, I therefore suggest that contractualists should respond to the ideal world objection by showing responsiveness to the different degrees to which it is likely for the relevant principles to be accepted in the world we live in.