In this paper I defend the view that pretence plays an important role for the development of imagination and should be seen as primary to imagination. In particular, I argue against the view that pretence should be seen as identical to imagination, or that pretence is just a subtype of imagination (i.e. imagination plus behaviour) such that imagination is a prerequisite for pretence. Instead, I will argue that pretence should be seen as primary to imagination and provides an important foundation for the development of imaginative abilities. I draw three main distinctions between pretence and imagination: being a social ability, being behaviour based vs. purely mental and its connection with reality. I argue that while in pretence one pretends something which one knows not to be the case, pretence maintains a close connection with the current situation. I sketch a developmental trajectory from early pretence without imagination, to imagination in the context of pretence and finally, to full blown imagination outside of the context of pretence. In doing so, I aim to clarify the relationship of pretence and imagination, as well as highlight the developmental significance of pretence for thinking beyond the here and now.