The discussion of negligence in moral philosophy literature is often one-sided as a result of a primary focus on the agent's risk assessment. To be sure, negligence is characterized by culpably lacking knowledge. However, most of the literature only focuses on the riskiness of the action with regard to harm. Further reference points for culpable ignorance are often neglected.

The following questions are to be answered: Which reference points can this lack of knowledge possibly have? Do the common characterizations of negligence apply to all possible points of reference? I argue that more of these are relevant than discussed in literature. The two reference points I focus on are, firstly, the knowledge of the ability to intervene if required , and, secondly, culpably erroneous knowledge of justifying circumstances. Both cases show that there is negligent action with full awareness of the risk of harm.

Furthermore, the diversity of duties of care that play a role in negligence is often overlooked. These duties can have various content. A satisfactory understanding of negligence requires taking this diversity into account and recognizing duties of care as secondary obligations to ensure compliance with more general primary duties such as preventing harm.