Despite intense debates on particular philosophical methods, such as conceptual analysis, the foundational question “What is a method?” remains surprisingly underexplored. This may be due to Russell’s dictum that “Nothing of value can be said on method except through examples,” which is, however, at odds with philosophers’ treatment of other key topics, like knowledge. This talk challenges Russell’s dictum constructively with a general account of methods as monotelicly coordinated generalized impersonal plans. The account crucially draws on observations about everyday methods, e.g., that methods (1) have constitutive goals, (2) are sketchy in practically irresolvable ways, (3) depend on contextual factors, and (4) exhibit goal unclarity. The account is supplemented with accounts of method-adoption and method-application. Roughly, adopting a method consists in personalizing its impersonal plan, and applying a method in realizing its generalized plan by a contextually particularized plan. Inter alia, the account enables a more systematic examination of method-evaluation in terms of, e.g., reliability and efficiency, goal-appropriateness and goal-clarity, and contextual adequacy. The account also sheds light on particular methods, such as philosophical argumentation or reflective equilibrium, and important methodological controversies, like the debate about “the scientific method”, which is plagued by a rigid and unrealistic understanding of methods.