The linguistic relativity hypothesis posits that languages shape non-linguistic cognition, leading to divergent thought patterns among speakers of different languages. Recently, linguistic relativity has gained significant traction in contemporary philosophy of mind, enactivism, and cognitive science. I argue that the focus on this hypothesis has led to a reductive conception of cognition, where linguistic elements are isolated from other cultural influences. This partitive conception of the mind is implausible, and I propose that a more promising approach is to investigate the mind’s action in ecologically valid real-life conditions. To achieve this, philosophers of mind should adopt an interdisciplinary approach, incorporating insights from anthropology and cognitive linguistics, and recognizing the interdependence of quantitative and qualitative research methods. My presentation will critically examine the internal logic of the linguistic relativity hypothesis and its methodological challenges, drawing on debates at the intersection of philosophy of mind and anthropology. I will argue that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between language, culture, and cognition is necessary to fully comprehend the complex dynamics of human cognition.