According to a widely shared belief, an explanation of phenomenal experience in terms of neural mechanisms is impossible in principle. The reason for this “Explanatory Gap” or “Hard Problem” is supposed to be that phenomenal experience cannot be captured in objective, functional terms.

Here, we will take three steps to avert this conclusion and show what an explanation of the qualitative character of phenomenal experience might look like.

Step I demonstrates that pivotal assumptions underlying the “Explanatory Gap” argument are unfounded. This means that it is possible to capture phenomenal states in functional terms and to solve the problem with the familiar methods of hypothesis development and -testing.

Step II presents a hypothesis how affective pain, a paradigmatic sort of phenomenal experience, can be captured in functional terms.

Step III presents empirical evidence corroborating this claim and indicates how this functional description can help to identify the neural mechanisms that explain affective pain experience.

We take this as proof of principle showing how the qualitative character of phenomenal experience can be explained. We conclude with some remarks on how this approach might contribute to future progress in the understanding of consciousness in general.