I aim to argue for the distinctiveness of a form of valuing, which I call existential valuing, the main function of which is to justify living one’s distinct life rather than regarding questions of interest. Self-interested and altruistic or moral valuing are forms of valuing concerned with what is in people’s interest – either one’s own or other people’s respectively. Existential valuing is pre-eminent with respect to questions of interest in the sense that, whilst it often overlaps with self-interested and altruistic valuing, it also provides an affirmative and definitive answer to the Existential Question “What justifies, in your eyes, living your distinct life?” Existential valuing grounds the possibility for one’s life to be perceived as meaningful, whereas self-interested valuing and altruistic valuing do not necessarily contribute to one’s life’s meaningfulness in terms of justification for living one’s distinct life. After having clarified the notions of valuing and of existential valuing in particular, I will show how the objections that have been raised against the distinctiveness of meaning in life as an evaluative domain independent from self-interest and morality do not apply to existential valuing, encouraging understanding the psychology of meaning in life in terms of existential valuing.