Martin Pickup (2023) has recently proposed a novel account of change, which he claims to circumvent the well-known concern about B-theoretic accounts that they fail to take change seriously enough: his situationalist account is supposed to accommodate all the desiderata that are thought to be crucial for viewing change as a robust phenomenon. According to the situationalist, what is the case is always relative to situations, but when two situations ‘disagreeing’ about how things are fuse into a larger one, it is metaphysically indeterminate how things are in the larger situation even though they are perfectly determinate in its proper parts—‘zooming out’ makes things fuzzy. The situationalist thus posits ‘worldly’ indeterminacy in any situation in which an object undergoes change—and indeterminacy of such a large scope is likely to alarm even those who are in general sympathetic to the idea. In this paper, I present an alternative, less costly account of the ‘unsettledness’ of large situations, one that views it as a matter of non-uniformity rather than indeterminacy.