On the classical conception of excuses, an agent is fully excused for φing in circumstances C on account of x iff φing was not blameworthy, yet still all-things-considered wrong. Here, I field a novel argument against this view. This argument takes its cue from the possibility of agents overcoming the obstacles on account of which they count as fully excused. As I argue, defenders of the classical conception face a dilemma in accounting for the surmountability of x. Either overcoming x and not-φing is impossible, in which case considerations of Ought Implies Can yield that φing in C is not wrong. Or overcoming x and not-φing is possible and supererogatory, in which case conceptual features of supererogation again guarantee that φing in C is not wrong. I then sketch an alternative view holding that excuses are a special agent-centred class of Dancy-style disablers. Specifically, these are factors that disable the reason-giving force of considerations for agents because these agents cannot be expected to φ in S. I flesh out and defend this view, showing how it allows us to retain crucial conceptual features of excuses without committing us to the problematic idea that excuses can remove blameworthiness without affecting permissibility.