Fig leaves such as “I’m not a racist but” or “I’m not transphobic but” represent pervasive yet insidious rhetorical devices, obscuring the impropriety of other utterances. On a common understanding, championed by Jennifer Saul and others, fig leaves block hearers from forming beliefs about the impropriety of the target utterance. I challenge this understanding on two grounds: first, it overlooks the varied epistemic impact of fig leaves, and second, it doesn’t capture how fig leaves are evidentially devious. To address these shortcomings, I propose a revised account. On my view, fig leaves are evidentially inert on their own while having an evidential effect when paired with flawed background beliefs. As a result, they often yield irrational credences regarding the impropriety of the target utterance. Based on this proposal, I discuss some strategies for resisting the pernicious effects of fig leaves.