Moral responsibility is tied to certain interpersonal practices – practices to which so-called reactive attitudes, most paradigmatically blame and praise, are central. We take up this broadly Strawsonian idea and discuss a problem arising from it. The responsibility-relevant practices would seem to have capacitarian prerequisites, i.e. individuals are the appropriate targets of the reactive attitudes only if they possess certain capacities – e.g. rational or interlocutory capacities. At the same time, participation in our responsibility-practices has the distinct advantages of reciprocity and normative directedness, from which individuals who lack the relevant capacities should also benefit. However, those who permanently lack the requisite capacities – such as people with severe cognitive disabilities (SCDs) – seem to be excluded from these advantages of our responsibility-practices, given their clear capacitarian prerequisites. We propose a solution to this problem: although it is inappropriate to adopt reactive attitudes towards people with SCDs, it is appropriate to relate to them as participants in other, non-capacitarian practices that are isomorphic to responsibility-practices and thus retain their advantages. At the centre of these practices lie relations of attentiveness and responsiveness, as discussed most prominently in care ethics.