In this paper, I discuss social hierarchies as a phenomenon of the occupational division of labor. Social hierarchies rank individuals and social groups according to status and esteem. While democratic–egalitarian societies subscribe to the idea that all humans are equals, our social world is still full of status asymmetries: professors, managers, and physicians are ranked above students, cleaners, and nurses. These rankings are a function of a system of division of labor. Through a division of labor, we produce the goods needed for social reproduction, but at the same time it creates different types of labor, and with it, different social roles. Some of these roles are intuitively higher than others, a ranking that expresses normative valence, which in turn is indicative of social hierarchies. This is a moral problem for a society of democratic equals. Does the occupational division of labor necessarily constitute a social hierarchy? If it does, then division of labor is incompatible with the idea of democratic equality. If it does not, the question arises what distinguishes social hierarchies from morally more benign social asymmetries, and whether and how we can turn the former into the latter.