According to the Balancing View of Ought (BV), an agent A ought to ϕ if and only if A’s reasons for ϕ-ing outweigh any competing set of reasons. Applied to belief, (BV) implies that we ought to believe p whenever the reasons for believing p are stronger than any competing set of reasons. However, we often seem permitted to refrain from believing what we have the strongest reasons to believe. For instance, we are not required to believe all the trivial implications of our evidence, even though they are strongly supported by epistemic reasons. I argue that (BV) can accommodate this permissivist intuition if we recognize that reasons for believing p not only compete with reasons for disbelieving p or suspending judgment about p, but also with reasons against forming any doxastic attitude toward p at all. Unlike more radically permissivist views, the resulting framework explains not only why we are typically permitted to refrain from forming evidentially supported beliefs, but also why doing so is epistemically impermissible when we attend (or ought to attend) to the relevant evidence in order to determine whether p is true.