Kantian constructivism in moral theory has the difficulty, especially salient in Korsgaard (1996), that the move from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, or from individual rationality to morality, is not properly justified. Even if one grants that rational action is action according to universal principles or laws, it is not clear why the universality of the laws guiding a person’s actions should take the specific form of the person conceiving of themselves as a legislator for all rational beings, rather than limiting the universality to the internal coherence of their own actions. Korsgaard’s attempts at solving this problem are unconvincing as they stand. Their appropriate foundation is provided by a transition to Fichtean or Hegelian constructivism (Darwall 2006, Samuel 2022), following the idea that reflective self-consciousness, and therefore reasons for action, essentially depend on the subject’s recognition as reasonable, reflective, and self-conscious by others. Reasons for action are by their very nature implicitly oriented toward others as potential justifications. In this orientation, one acknowledges the authority of others. This has substantial consequences for morality, but is still compatible with different moral codes.