It is commonly held that Davidson’s truth-conditional theory of meaning cannot serve to characterize the concept of truth. The thought is that such a theory of meaning presupposes the concept of truth and, taking it as given, explains meaning in terms of it. This point is then used to argue further that one cannot be both a deflationist about truth and a truth-conditional theorist of meaning (Dummett, 1959; see also Horwich 1990, Gupta 1993, Brandom 2009).

I will argue that the commonly held view I have just sketched is radically misguided. Properly understood, a Davidsonian theory of meaning is equally explanatory of both truth and meaning, insofar as it makes precise the claim that neither notion is intelligible independently of the other. I will show that Dummett’s influential argument fails. And I will suggest that Davidsonian deflationism is not only possible, but also more promising than its deflationist alternatives.