Some epistemologists argue for the claim that we can wrong others by what we believe about them. In this paper, we shall argue that if we believe in the notion of doxastic wronging, then we should also be open to the possibility of zetetic wronging, i.e. the possibility to wrong others by having an inquisitive attitude about them, irrespective of any subsequent action. First, we shall show that intuitions from cases, as well as the apology argument, provide prima facie support for the concept of zetetic wronging. By parity of reasoning, if these arguments support doxastic wronging, they should likewise support zetetic wronging. Second, we shall explain how inquisitive attitudes can wrong. We shall argue that inquisitive attitudes toward a question Q can be wrongful because of the kind of attitude they are: (i) they are incompatible with holding an outright belief about the answer to Q, (ii) they are goal-directed attitudes and come with satisfaction conditions, (iii) they are responsive to reasons. Finally, we shall argue that zetetic wronging is best thought of as an alternative to doxastic wronging as it can explain the wrong of paradigmatic cases, as well as additional wrongs that doxastic wronging cannot address.