Institutional facts (facts constituted by the collective recognition of their existence) appear to be ontologically peculiar, and a realist perspective on them appears to encounter certain problems. One issue is the possibility of inconsistencies, which may occur when inconsistent states of affairs are collectively recognized.

In a recent article, Richard Corry proposes a solution to this problem. His suggestion is that institutional facts do not exist absolutely but are ontologically relative. According to his proposal, the collective recognition that p through G does not entail the straightforward occurrence of p; rather, it results in the occurrence of p-relative-to-G.

In our presentation, we aim to show, first, that Corry’s account faces significant problems: (a) it is ontologically revisionary, (b) its development appears epistemically ad hoc, and (c) its extension is materially inadequate, if we trust general intuitions.

Secondly, there seems to be an inherent dilemma in the attempt to avoid the inconsistency problem by adopting relativist ontological assumptions, as proposed by Corry. It seems that, quite generally, an account either fails to capture the institutional facts as we conceive of them adequately, or it succumbs to the inconsistency problem.