There is an overlooked dilemma for the overdemandingness objection. The intuition behind this objection is that morality must allow agents to live good lives. Yet, the two most obvious ways to spell out this intuition are unsatisfactory.

(1) Morality must leave room for a person to live their good life, by pursuing their central commitments, projects, and preferences (CPPs). This is too permissive: Morality could not ask agents to sacrifice the pursuit of any CCPs that happen to be central to their lives.

(2) Morality must leave room for a person to live a good life, irrespective of how this life relates to who they are right now. This is too restrictive: Agents could be required to sacrifice the pursuit of any and all of their central CCPs, if it would be possible for them to change into a person who would live a good life by pursuing different CPPs.

To overcome this dilemma, the demandingness debate must shift its focus. Instead of asking how much agents can be asked to sacrifice of the pursuit of their actual CPPs, we must ask under what conditions and in what way agents can be expected to change the content of these CCPs.