The utterance of “because”-sentences is typically construed as an assertion of some explanatory or grounding relation between the propositions expressed by the adjacent sentences. With an utterance of “The street is wet because it has been raining,” the speaker asserts that the fact that it has been raining causally explains the fact that the street is wet. In our paper, we highlight an often neglected use: what we call the reason-giving use of “because”-sentences. By saying, “John likes Mary, because he brought her flowers,” the speaker gives a reason for believing that John likes Mary. We hold that reason-giving acts are not descriptions of explanatory relations between two propositions, but expressions of basing-relations between attitudes. We will (i) discuss possible ways of determining on the basis of linguistic and epistemological criteria which of the two uses is at play in a given case, (ii) analyse both uses in terms of a contrast class-based analysis, and (iii) claim that utterances of “because”-sentences are level-ambiguous: “because” can operate on propositions or on the beliefs that represent those propositions. We conclude by pointing out some implications for both metaphysics and epistemology.