In the epistemology of disagreement, Conciliationism argues that encountering peer disagreement on controversial matters rationally requires belief suspension, as the disagreement itself defeats justification. This implies an extensive skepticism about philosophical statements. This contribution defends the consistency of the skeptical argument from disagreement against claims of self-defeat by disentangling it from Conciliationism and grounding it instead in the Pyrrhonian dialectic of the criterion. The argument is structured around Thomas Grundmann’s critique that the skeptical argument relies on justified philosophical beliefs, contravening its conclusion. The presentation first challenges Grundmann’s analysis of self-defeat. It then reconstructs a more viable Pyrrhonian disagreement-based skeptical argument independent of Conciliationism. This improved argument avoids the self-defeating charge and is not bound to command suspension of judgment. This makes disagreement skepticism compatible with practical reasons for retaining one’s philosophical beliefs.