The talk considers the categorization of affective injustice as a form of pure structural injustice and its consequences for guilt, blame and responsibility. Starting from the premise that affective injustice is a form of structural injustice according to Young, the talk argues that a paradigmatic form of affective injustice (“uptake injustice”) qualifies as pure structural injustice according to McKeown. This means that there are no agents who have the power to directly change the social structures relevant to the injustice. At the same time, and contrary to other forms of pure structural injustice, the individual manifestations of this injustice are not blameless. It is possible to hold individuals responsible for the harm caused, because the relevant harm has an individual cause as well as a structural one. Accordingly, moral responsibility can exist where theories of structural injustice only locate political responsibility. These hybrid causes of the harms of certain forms of affective injustice show that the relations between power, guilt, blame and responsibility in theories of structural injustice must be further differentiated.