A recently emerged form of deflationism about metaphysical modality (Clarke-Doane 2019, 2021; Priest 2021) challenges the very project of defining what metaphysical modality really is. Rather than reducing it to another modal or non-modal notion (e.g., apriority or analyticity), new deflationists argue that the concept of metaphysical necessity is intrinsically indeterminate or indefinitely extensible. They claim that for any proposition P judged metaphysically necessary, one can always introduce an alternative notion of necessity under which P is possible. This leads to a form of modal pluralism, akin to logical or set-theoretic pluralism. Just as it makes no sense to seek the “real” axioms of set theory, new deflationists argue that searching for the definitive interpretation of “could have been” is misguided. In this talk, I will evaluate this novel deflationist stance, outlining the different strategies it employs. Ultimately, however, I will defend a traditional monist approach to metaphysical modality. By critically examining the indeterminacy strategy that underpins modal pluralism, I will highlight its weaknesses and argue that a unified, monist view remains a viable and preferable alternative.