The Better Best System Account (BBSA) of laws of nature is a descendant of Lewis's Best System Account (BSA). However, the BBSA divorces with the notion of natural properties and instead features a relative freedom on the selection of the basic set of properties. But this move evades an important issue regarding the selected properties: their relationship to the world. In this paper, I want to assert, with [schrenk 2023] that the BBSA proponents should give an account of the semantic theories that could coincide with their claims.

However, I will argue, against Schrenk, in favour of a certain understanding of Semantic Externalism (SE) supported by Putnam. To support this claim, I will answer the first main objection given by Schrenk against SE to show it can be be a genuine option for the contemporary humean accounts of laws. SE can still, in a rightful way, provide a form of freedom in the choice of predicates / properties required for the pluralistic approach of the BBSA.