This paper discusses the moral specificity of sexual encounters and the consequences this has for the moral magic of consent in the sexual realm. In general, the philosophical debate on consent treats sexual encounters as any other encounter whose moral status depends on consent. On this understanding, if everyone involved (validly) consents to the sexual encounter in question, then at least no one is wronged by it. Otherwise, it is a sexual violation. The non-consenting party is wronged because it is a violation of their rights. I will argue that the conclusion to analogy does not work, and that sexual encounters do indeed have special moral properties compared to other encounters whose moral status depends on consent. I will argue this along the lines of intimacy, vulnerability and embodiment. Intimacy and vulnerability entail specific duties for persons sharing the intimate or vulnerable encounter/relationship, and embodiment makes it impossible to distinguish between rights-holders and rights-objects. Taken together, these three features make sexual encounters insufficiently comparable to other encounters whose moral status depends on consent. I will conclude that consequently the moral magic of consent works differently when it comes to sexual encounters.