Kripke (1980) argues that the reference of a name gets fixed to an entity by a baptism and can then be transmitted via chains of communication, provided that the speaker has the intention of preserving reference. An influential problem with this view is that there seem to be cases, such as the famous “Madagascar” case, where all of Kripke's requirements for reference-preservation are met, and yet the name switches its referent. Evans (1973) argues that such cases force us to move from a causal to a hybrid view of reference. Similarly, Michaelson (2021) proposes temporal externalism as a solution. We argue that the relevant cases can be dealt with without abandoning or modifying the Kripkean view. All we need is (i) the familiar distinction, due to Kripke (1977), between semantic reference and speaker reference (and the intentions that underlie them) and (ii) a counterfactual test that allows us to establish which of them has priority for the relevant speakers. This solution develops Kripke’s (1980: 163) idea that a present intention to refer can “override” an intention to preserve a distant link to the original usage of the name.