The Personite Problem (Johnston 2016, 2017) purports to show that perdurantism contrasts with our moral and prudential practices. Johnston considers this result an objection to perdurantism. The key claim is that personites have the same moral status of persons, where a personite is a proper part of a person that shares her mind and some relevant part of her body.

Johnston’s Master Argument for the claim that personites have the same moral status of persons is based on three premises. Importantly, the property of having a moral profile for persons is determined by a basis of intrinsic properties. I argue that the basis of properties for a personite is different, and this makes Johnston’s premise (2) false. Specifically, I argue for the claims: i) That the mental attitudes for personites are systematically wrong is grounded on the fact that these attitudes are true when possessed by the person and that the personite is a proper part of the person: ii) The mind of the personite extrinsic and depends on its person. I also dismiss the objection that the basis of properties of the personite determines a different moral status that produces a revenge personite problem.