Myside bias is the tendency to favour one's prior beliefs in the gathering and evaluation of evidence. Despite it being a bias, it is unclear whether myside bias should always be considered epistemically irrational and which, if any, intervention it requires. It is also unclear which demarcation criteria we could use to make out rational and irrational applications of myside reasoning. The consensual and veritistic effects of myside bias are relevant to these issues, but they remain largely unknown. Can agents that deliberate with a myside bias ever come to agreement? How would interventions against myside bias shape our pathway to the truth? This talk contributes to our understanding of myside bias by exploring these consensual and veritistic dynamics in a computational model of artificial, rational agents. Simulations on the model suggest that there are at least two types of myside bias with significantly different epistemic effects. These results contribute to understanding the function of myside bias in our reasoning and when we should intervene.