It can be profoundly unclear whether we are blameworthy for harms in which we have been causally involved. But how should one then respond? More specifically, should one offer an apology? This paper introduces Pascal’s Apology, drawing inspiration from Pascal’s Wager. Just as Pascal argued that belief in God is the safer bet under uncertainty, Pascal’s Apology suggests that apologising is the safer moral choice—better to apologise and risk unnecessary admission than to withhold apology and risk moral failure. The paper develops this idea by distinguishing between the “in case” and “(as) if” models of apology, constructing the strongest version of Pascal’s Apology and addressing criticisms against so-called conditional apologies. However, I argue that Pascal’s Apology ultimately fails as an erroneous workaround. It retains a strong connection to fault, assuming that under perfect knowledge, one should apologise only if at fault. I challenge this assumption, arguing instead that the obligation to apologise rests on other factors. In particular, the prevention of expressive harm—such as conveying disrespect or neglect—can generate an obligation to apologise, even in the absence of fault. This analysis sheds new light on the nature and moral significance of apologies.