Criminal entrapment occurs whenever one party, the “Agent”, intentionally brings it about that another, the “Target”, commits a criminal offence, intending to have the Target prosecuted and punished for committing the offence.The Agent could either be a state official (“state entrapment”) or a private party (“private entrapment”).

Several jurisdictions and parts of the literature allow blocking the prosecution or conviction only for Targets of state entrapment.

The article defends the position that we need to discern the distinctive wrongness of entrapment to ascertain whether the identity of the Agent should matter for whether, and if so, by whom, the Target ought to be held accountable for the criminal offence into which they were entrapped.

It argues that entrapment amounts to an objectionable subversion of practices of accountability. Some instances of entrapment are permissible. There is reason to block the prosecution of Targets of impermissible instances to prevent the Agent’s scheme from coming to fruition, regardless of the (state or private) identity of the Agent. This reason is, however, typically weak and therefore often defeated. Contrary to current legal practice, Agents involved in impermissible instances of entrapment ought to be prosecuted if their behaviour amounts, in itself, to a criminal offence.