Ranking theory is a well-established account of rational belief (= taking to be true) and its dynamics. It is, however, theoretically mandatory that a formal representation of epistemic states be extendable to a decision theory. Ultimately, epistemic states manifest themselves in rational action; each such representation should be able to say how. Alas, the decision-theoretic extension of ranking theory is still wanting. Giang & Shenoy (2000) is the only, but not well received proposal so far, for reasons to be explained. This talk will present a modification of this proposal. In analogy to standard decision theory, the upshot will be a theorem proving a unique representation of a preference relation over ranking-theoretic prospects (instead of lotteries) by an ‘expected utility’ function for those prospects (where expectation works in the ranking-theoretic, not in the familiar probabilistic way, whence the underlying utility function works like a ranking function too). What is this good for? One perhaps surprising, but instructive application is that this ranking-theoretic decision theory allows advancing the field of (conditional) deontic logic by providing the first substantial account of how (subjective) norms and beliefs interact. This is to show that this theory is a fruitful one deserving further development.