Constitutivism is a popular strategy in metaethics that seeks to ground normativity in certain kinds of features that are constitutive of agency (Korsgaard 2009; Velleman 2009). Enoch’s so-called »shmagency challenge« called the normative source of agency itself into question and kindled a debate over how agency can be shown to be normatively non-arbitrary (Enoch 2006, 2011). A large portion of this debate revolves around the question whether agency is inescapable, i.e. the idea that being an agent is non-optional and that shmagency is simply not a position one could coherently occupy (Ferrero 2009, 2018; Katsafanas 2013; O’Hagan 2013; Velleman 2009). However, the debate is somewhat locked in a stalemate because there seems to be no clear way how to decide on the question of the (non-)intelligibility of shmagency other than relying on one’s metaethical intuitions, which prompted Enoch to note a certain kind of »they-just-don’t-get-it feeling« (Enoch 2011, 228) on both sides of the debate. This paper will sketch a way out of this stalemate by showing how the shmagency challenge is semantically defective.