Feminist epistemologists have long observed that otherwise disadvantaged social positions sometimes come with epistemic benefits. Although such benefits imply comparative deficits on the part of those occupying more advantaged social positions, the distinctive deficits on the part of otherwise privileged persons remain underexamined. This paper focuses on certain epistemic deficits suffered by those occupying positions that grant coercive power. I argue that those occupying such positions are systematically disadvantaged due to this power. In short, coercive power functions—or, at least, can function—to bias the flow of information toward the agent possessing this power.

Such biasing can cause at least three sorts of epistemic challenges for those in positions of coercive power. First, such agents may be fed information intended to please them, rather than to inform them, and may consequently be misinformed. Second, unwelcome information may be withheld from such agents, and thus such agents may be uninformed. Finally, even if agents in positions of coercive power are not misinformed or uninformed, the mere plausible threat that the information they receive is subject to such bias may be enough to compromise the warrant for their beliefs.