In this paper, I provide a general argument for the so-called X-First programme in the debate about normativity and defend X-First accounts against recent criticism. According to X-First accounts, there is a single normative primitive that is normatively fundamental and involved in explaining all other normative phenomena. Recently, Daniel Wodak (2020) has argued against X-First accounts by questioning the assumption that there is a single normative primitive. Wodak defends an alternative view, according to which normativity is the disjunction of multiple normative features. I argue that disjunctive accounts either force us to abandon large parts of our ambitions to understand normativity, or are themselves committed to the X-First methodology. It is argued that in the absence of local X-First accounts, disjunctive accounts fail to explain those parts of the structure of normativity which call for explanation, while their attempt to account for the unity of normativity is a postulate of what they set out to explain. These considerations, I argue, provide a positive argument for the X-First programme: We need to investigate X-First accounts in order to learn more about normativity.