Normative blackballing is a practise that actively terminates a friendship. This paper argues that normative blackballing is not morally permissible in cases where one party develops morally bad beliefs if we hold the view that friendships are robust attachments. I will draw on Brennan’s work (2023) and take the argument as given that no objective sufficiency criteria can be offered to justify normative blackballing. I will then show how subjective accounts also fail to justify normative blackballing by showing that there is no mechanism to appropriately weigh trivial, but passionately held, beliefs, nor beliefs that betray a ‘special interest’ in a particular moral topic. If any belief an agent themself considers sufficiently bad justifies normative blackballing, then this undermines friendship’s robust nature. We either have to accept the subjective criteria and reject robustness, or accept robustness and deny that beliefs are sufficient for normative blackballing. Given how undesirable and counter-intuitive the former option is, I suggest we adopt the latter position.