Truth minimalism is the idea that truth doesn't play a substantial explanatory role and the concept of truth is exhausted by platitudes about it. Truth minimalism is taken to have the tendency to creep to other semantic and more generally representational notions, leading to the problem of creeping minimalism: realism/representationalism and expressivism about a discourse become indistinguishable. The creeping tendency for minimalism has been largely taken for granted in the literature. This talk challenges this assumption and argues that, while it is certainly possible for minimalism to creep, there is no pressure for an expressivist who embraces truth minimalism to go further and take up minimalism about other semantic and/or representational notions.

This talk focuses on two reasons for creeping minimalism that has been raised in the literature.

1) Expressivists are motivated to truth minimalism because it helps them accommodate ordinary uses of moral language, and this inevitably leads them to go minimalist about other notions like beliefs.

2) Notions like truth, proposition, belief and representation are taken to have constitutive connections to one another, so minimalism inevitably creeps along these links.

This talk resists creeping minimalism by offering arguments against these two reasons.