In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant introduces gratitude as an imperfect duty to others. Kant’s characterisation of the duty of gratitude is, however, not easily reconciled with the idea that being thankful is an imperfect duty, i.e., a duty which allows agents to find their own distinctive ways in which to realise the demands of the moral law. Rather, Kant appears to suggest that recipients of beneficent gifts are required to reciprocate favours as if they had to make up for a debt, thereby bringing gratitude close to the fulfilment of a perfect duty. In this talk, I aim to challenge the view that Kant wants us to understand gratitude as a duty to repay a debt. To that end, I propose a novel reading which helps us make sense of gratitude as an imperfect duty. On the Opportunity Reading, as I shall call it, the duty of gratitude consists in taking acts of benevolence one has received as opportunities to become oneself a benefactor to others. In this regard, the duty of gratitude turns out to be a version of the duty of beneficence and thus a genuine imperfect duty to make the well-being of others one’s end.