In this talk I want to answer the question which criteria a scientific claim has to fulfill in order to be considered as acceptable to public reason in the Rawlsian sense. Belloio argues that a scientific claim is acceptable to public reason if it is a consensus among experts and is reached via a publicly accepted method. However, I argue that in the debate around what scientific claims should be acceptable to public reason the role of non-epistemic values is overlooked. For a statement to be acceptable to public reason it is not only important for it to be a consensus among experts and reached via a publicly accepted method but also that this consensus is based on a variety of non-epistemic values which represent the non-epistemic values held by the public to some extent. This is the case as different non-epistemic values can lead to different scientific results. So, a citizen who reasonably disagrees with the non-epistemic values which underlie a scientific consensus cannot be reasonably expected to accept this consensus as justification for coercion over her. Therefore it is important for a scientific consensus to be acceptable to public reason to rely on a variety of non-epistemic values.