In Seneca, the term veritas/verum usually appears in a context that resembles skepticism. He is nevertheless considered by the majority of scholars, especially in more recent studies, to follow Stoic sensualism on the grounds of his arguably evident Stoic materialism. Following Hachmann (2006), who pointed out that Seneca found sensory perception insufficient for moral progress, I argue that Seneca does not adopt sensualism from the stoics, even though he remains true to their materialism. Thus, I suggest that in his case, the question about his materialism should be investigated inde-pendently of the sensualism-question. My intention here is to isolate the latter, and investigate not only Seneca’s famous passages on veritas, but also the broader context. In this respect, I offer a statistical analysis and interpretation of further relevant terms and concepts. Seneca’s rare use of the term comprehensio, as well as the equivalence of the meaning between the terms opinio and scientia seem to reveal strong evidence - which haven’t yet received the attention they deserve in scholarship - for my claim.