Peirce’s pragmatist theory of truth posits that truth is the eventual outcome of an indefinitely extensive amount of scientific research. The minima trivialia objection challenges this theory by pointing to common sense truths, such as what one had for breakfast, which are not the result of prolonged collective scientific effort. However, this objection fails if we adopt Sellars’s distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image of humanity in the world, along with the associated scientific realism. In this Sellarsian framework, minima trivialia are viewed as akin to claims defended from the perspective of the manifest image, like the existence and persistence of material objects, and not as genuine truths, which are recognised only from the scientific image’s viewpoint. But the myth of the categorial given, according to Sellars, entails that the views from the manifest image are essentially naïve realist claims about the categorial dimension of reality. Hence, only claims that properly belong to the scientific image—explanatorily and empirically adequate—are good candidates for satisfying categorial truths. So, in the end, embracing this distinction, which aligns well with Peirce’s framework, circumvents the minima trivialia objection.