Conference Agenda

One of the most recent evolutions in the digital governance space is the diffusion of digital sovereignty as a policy principle, i.e a principle that conveys political intentions, beliefs and values to policy-makers, and provides the whole policy process with general guidance. Once the prerogative of authoritarian regimes aiming at gaining power and authority over Internet governance both at the global and the domestic levels (Goldsmith and Wu 2006; Mueller 2010), the principle of digital sovereignty has recently spread in the policy discourse and practice of democratic institutions as well.

The main objective of this research is to probe into the social processes through which different meanings of digital sovereignty are elaborated by different actors, how they are used, and how they interact with particular contexts and political conditions. The object of investigation is the interplay between the production of digital sovereignty claims and the actual position of the claimant within contingent power relations. In order to do so, this paper (a) elaborates an analytical framework to study digital sovereignty claims, drawing on the combination of available literature on the topic with constructivist theories of sovereignty; b) deploys this framework to study the policy discourse around digital sovereignty in a wide and heterogeneous geographical area, i.e. the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Findings suggest that there are two policy principles of digital sovereignty in use in the region. One is a protective principle, which expresses a reactive posture to the development of digital technologies and is aimed at protecting state sovereignty from either malicious external actors or the (often undefined) challenges of digitalization. The second type principle detected by this analysis is a competitive principle. While the protective principle aims to shield the state from the Internet, the competitive principle is more proactive, aiming to shape the Internet by the state.

In pursuit of its goal of becoming a global actor on the world stage, the European Union has actively attempted to create a more significant role for its Self through various policies and legislation across several policy fields. The EU’s digital policy and the European Commission’s priority to establish European digital sovereignty clearly show a desire to become a global actor in the digital realm. Several scholars working in the Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory tradition have in recent years focused on using central concepts found in this tradition, mainly role-taking and role-making processes. In these attempts, another core concept, ‘altercasting,’ has been neglected. Altercasting can be understood as “projecting an identity, to be assumed by other(s) with whom one is in interaction, which is congruent with one’s own goals” (Weinstein/Deutschberger 1963: 454).

In response to this gap, Oppermann has recently developed an altercasting framework for foreign policy that could be used to understand the altercasting actor and their agency. This framework (1) addresses the preconditions for actors to engage in altercasting, (2) the influence of domestic politics on altercasting and (3) altercasting techniques consisting of self-presentation, signalling (dis)approval of Alter behaviour and articulation of behavioural demands on the Alter.

This research applies this framework to the EU’s digital policy to further our understanding of the preconditions that lead the EU to engage with altercating processes, the role of internal politics (adjusted to the EU context), and the altercasting techniques in which it participates. This will contribute to our understanding of how the EU is attempting to create a role of “global actor” with the help of its digital policies and the role of Alters in this process. Secondly, it provides a new case study in which the usefulness of the framework proposed by Oppermann can be tested.

This research investigates the nature and implications of the European Union (EU)’s recent discourse and policy approach towards technology standards, with a specific focus on Internet, 5G and artificial intelligence standards. Due to their economic and strategic importance, technology standards are inevitably the subject and reflection of intense economic and political battles. We refer to standards as normative specifications enabling systems to communicate with each other, and allowing interoperability of different software and hardware.

This research analyses the effects of the discursive turn of the EU – as part of its digital sovereignty agenda and new standardisation strategy – for European and global technology standard-setting processes. It considers the implications of having an EU policy agenda characterised by new sovereignty claims in this domain, and investigates whether this new discourse has materialised into substantial changes in the way the EU engages with the making process of standards since 2019.

Between 2019 and 2024, the EU has been particularly active in the digital policy space, with direct implications for global/European standard-setting organisations such as ETSI and CEN-CENELEC. This is primarily illustrated by the 2022 European standardisation strategy, but also other digital policy legislations such as the Digital Markets Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act and the eIDAS regulation.

Despite this multiplication of European standardisation initiatives, this research argues that the EU’s approach towards technology standard-setting has been and remains inconsistent. It argues that the EU’s increasing “digital assertiveness” and digital sovereignty discourses have led to a few noticeable policy evolutions, whose effects remain largely unintended and that could further normalise state-based interventions in technology governance.

The European Union (EU) aspires to establish itself as a space power and to protect its distinct interests in the space domain. It has responded to the new race in space to deploy mega satellite constellations, characterised by the deployment of thousands of satellites in the non-geostationary orbit (NGSO), by planning its own Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS2). The perceived benefits of these systems go beyond commercial competition for a share of the global revenues generated by broadband Internet services. The civil and military advantages associated with an enhanced presence in outer space and control over an integral part of the global communications infrastructure are connected to the EU’s strategic autonomy objectives, reflecting the global strive towards regional notions of sovereignty in digital space.[1] These motivations are significant for any global actor with the technological and financial means to undertake such extensive projects. Sparked by the success of the frontrunner Starlink, a private venture based in the United States (US), this global competition is under time pressure to secure a part of the limited orbital capacity. The NGSO is rapidly becoming congested, primarily due to the sheer scale of satellite constellation projects. Consequently, like others, the EU perceives that promptly ensuring its presence in NGSO to reinforce its civil, governmental and defence infrastructure resilience through autonomous access to space-based communication services is crucial for protecting its distinct commercial and security-related interests.[2] The EU's decision to participate in the NGSO scramble also reveals the contours of its understanding of the global commons concept as it applies to outer space.