Conference Agenda

Monitoring and punishment are common tools for increasing the cost of non-compliance. In developing country contexts, however, these tools are often ineffective or inefficient. We investigate an alternative approach:

Subsidies that reduce the cost of compliance. We conduct a randomized controlled trial with 799 boat owners at Lake Victoria, Kenya and Tanzania, clustered at the level of landing sites. We offer compliant fishing net panels for sale and investigate the effect of discounts on the purchase and use of non-compliant panels. We test the impact of the subsidy under a regime with enforcement (Tanzania) and without enforcement (Kenya). We find that a discount of US\$10 on compliant panels crowds out an average of 1.5 non-compliant panels. The effect is higher in the absence of enforcement (1.5 panels) than in the presence of enforcement (half a panel). Second, when offered a second time (3 months later) the subsidy treatment significantly increases the likelihood of purchase, suggesting that subsidies can lead to sustained reductions in non-compliance and this effect is particularly pronounced under enforcement.

Managing open-access fisheries effectively remains a significant challenge, particularly for shared resources like Lake Victoria. This study examines fishers' preferences and willingness to pay for Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) systems in Uganda and Kenya through a stated-choice experiment, focusing on key institutional features such as detection rates, corruption levels, and election processes, while also identifying national differences in preferences. The results highlight inter-country differences in MCS preferences. While fishers in both Uganda and Kenya favor landing-site-based MCS systems over the other alternatives, the preferences between the other alternatives differ. While Ugandan fishers do not show significant differences in the preferences between local, national government-led and military-based MCS, Kenyan fishers demonstrate a higher preference for military-based MCS over local or national government-led systems. In Kenya, we also observe a significantly stronger willingness to pay for reduced corruption, enhanced detection rates and directly elected enforcers These findings highlight the significant role of past experiences with MCS in shaping fishers’ preferences, underscoring the need for tailored policy approaches that consider local preferences and contextual realities. Strengthening community-based management structures, combating corruption, and fostering participatory decision-making are critical steps toward achieving sustainable fisheries management in the Lake Victoria region.

Compliance with environmental regulations relies on a nuanced understanding of both formal incentives and informal social motivations. This paper explores the impact of social and moral norms on individuals’ decisions to engage in illegal fishing activities. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates social norms and peer effects to assess the utility derived from these choices, revealing an equilibrium where only half of the individuals adhere to regulations. We then present a discrete choice model to empirically investigate the effect of these drivers on illegal fishing behaviour. A Hybrid Choice Model is specified, featuring a latent variable that captures fishing-related social norms. Using data collected in 2020 from a fishing community in Ghana, encompassing 410 fishermen, their households, and various fishing practices—including the illegal activity of Saiko fishing—we uncover key findings. Observable indicators, particularly fishermen’s perceptions of peer attitudes toward fishing bans, effectively capture the social norm. Furthermore, the fishing social norm significantly influences both fishermen's satisfaction and their decision to participate in illegal activities. Finally, we extend the analysis to the intensive margin, examining hours spent on Saiko retail and the productivity of participants. The latent score is found to be negatively associated with the intensity of Saiko fishing, indicating that social norms impose a constraining effect even after the decision to engage in the activity has been made.

In recent decades, collective property rights have emerged globally as a key policy tool to promote environmental conservation. However, empirical evidence linking collective titling to improved environmental outcomes remains inconclusive, with researchers often struggling to explain their findings. This study addresses this gap by proposing that the environmental impact of titling programs is contingent on the strength of intra-community institutions, with more cohesive institutions generating greater conservation outcomes — as suggested by the literature on common pool resources. We test this argument by examining the impacts on deforestation of various programs that granted collective titles to Afro-descendant communities in Brazil over the past thirty years. Utilizing satellite imagery and survey data, we demonstrate that collective titling helps reduce deforestation. Notably, these positive effects are predominantly observed in communities with strong pre-existing collective institutions. Our results indicate that while collective titling can be an effective strategy for promoting sustainability, its success depends on the presence of robust intra-community institutions. This suggests that coupling titling programs with institutional development initiatives could be a more adequate approach for enhancing the environmental benefits of titling programs.